Only a few months after Kyiv was retaken from the Nazis in November 1943, the returning Stalinists started avoiding public mention of what had happened at places like Babyn Yar. The anti-Semitism that had emerged in the resource-starved Soviet rear may have been the reason for hushing up the fate of Soviet Jews under the Nazis—a conclusion bolstered by a study of wartime Tashkent where many Jewish evacuees lived. At the same time, the Stalin regime’s wartime approval of Ukrainian nationalism to spur support for the Soviet cause was curtailed as the Kremlin encountered resistance to its return in Western Ukraine.
Reconciliation between parties in a violent conflict usually depends first of all on an end to the violence. In her contribution to this discussion forum, Oxana Shevel raised the challenges that Ukraine faces in the attempt to end the war in the Donbas, including the lack of desire among the Ukrainian political elites to compromise with Russia on issues of Ukraine’s sovereignty and the lack of incentives for Russia to stop backing the self-declared “republics” in the Donbas. Because an overall resolution to the conflict seems currently to be out of reach, Shevel rightly emphasizes the real possibilities of an internal dialogue now, under circumstances in Ukraine’s East that remain unchanged. In my contribution, I illuminate why the overall conflict will be so hard to resolve.
Until the 1970s the dominant understanding of Canadian history was limited to that of the progress and development of an Anglo-Saxon, and to a smaller degree, French majority, which presupposed a history of successful conquest of the so-called “virgin lands” of the British and French empires. For a long time, the ideas of “progress” and “success” (of Anglo-Saxons and the French) served all major metaphors and concepts in scholarly, popular, and ideological reflections on the “building” and development of Canada as a state and nation.