Meaningful and lasting reconciliation would require difficult compromises on all sides – be it by the residents of “big Ukraine” or by the residents of the non-government controlled Donbas. Since at present “big Ukraine” can only control its own choices, it is up to “big Ukraine” to decide whether to start an open but difficult dialogue that would break taboos about what constitutes a legitimate opinion or position to express. Creating public space for such a dialogue is something Ukraine has the power to do in the conditions of the continued Russian aggression and Russia’s support for the anti-Kyiv insurgency in Donbas. Inter-Ukraine dialogue by itself is not going to end Russian involvement in the Donbas conflict, but it can contribute towards reconciliation between “pro-Maidan” and...

Until the 1970s the dominant understanding of Canadian history was limited to that of the progress and development of an Anglo-Saxon, and to a smaller degree, French majority, which presupposed a history of successful conquest of the so-called “virgin lands” of the British and French empires. For a long time, the ideas of “progress” and “success” (of Anglo-Saxons and the French) served all major metaphors and concepts in scholarly, popular, and ideological reflections on the “building” and development of Canada as a state and nation. Two majorities – Anglo-Saxon and French – positioned themselves as the two principal Canadian nations. In the 1970s Canada reoriented itself towards a new course in its self-understanding as a nation, that is, by inventing a policy of multiculturalism.

Minority identities have come to figure centrally in constructions of Ukrainian identity, as post-Soviet Ukrainians seek to define themselves as modern and worthy members of the international community. The inclusion of ethnic and racial diversity serves as a marker of enlightenment and global connectedness, a counterpoint to stereotypes of Ukrainians as isolated, rural, and uncivilized. The image of Ukraine as cosmopolitan and inclusive is part of an effort to construct Ukraine as a globally and locally desirable brand, part of the global trend of the commodification and marketing of ethnicity and nation. Various scholars have argued that it is useful to view Ukraine as a postcolonial country. This approach supports a parallelism between Africans and Ukrainians as sharing histories of...

In a recent meeting with the new French president Emmanuel Macron, the Russian president Vladimir Putin referred to Anna Yaroslavna (also known as Anna of Kyiv) as "Russian Anne," in an attempt to point to both a long-standing connection between Russia and France, and to Russia's importance for French history. Playing on the ambiguity in the use of the adjective "Russian" – a use that removes the difference between the Rusian state – Kyivan Rus' (hence the use of one "s" in this adjective), the largest kingdom in Medieval Europe, – and the modern Russian state that grew out of Muscovy – the Duchy of Moscow. (In the Russian language, the difference is obvious: "russkiy" points to Kyivan Rus', while "rossiyskiy" points to "Rossiya," the modern Russia.) One, likely intended, consequence was..

Those who follow Ukrainian issues today know that many foreigners who consider themselves radical leftists oppose that country’s attempt to break away from its former imperial master. Surprisingly, they support the attempt of a capitalist Russian government that legitimates itself in terms of religion, has an imperialist foreign agenda based on settler-colonist minorities beyond its borders, and subscribes to “spheres of influence” thinking to re-impose its control over Ukraine. It is a re-imposition that, as of 2014, involved the use of military force in Ukraine. Their stance places such leftists alongside those they normally regard as their enemies: big bankers, corporate directors, and lawyers who profit from their contacts with Vladimir Putin and his associates...

Since the end of 2014, we have been closely following the dramatic developments in the Russian Center of the International PEN – the Center where we used to have many good friends, colleagues and partners for much-needed intercultural dialogue. Unfortunately, this dialogue was severed under the new leadership that unequivocally took the side of the authoritarian Russian government. The "loyalists" came to cheer vociferously the Kremlin’s jingoistic policies abroad, and endorse silently its repressive policies at home. Still worse, the new leadership of the Russian PEN has got increasingly tough on any dissent in the organization. They started up with a purge of dissenters from the executive board, continued with smearing them as “national traitors,” and ended up with expelling from PEN...

For Ukraine, Russian aggression raised fundamental questions about its continuing existence as a united state, its independence as a nation, and the democratic foundations of its political institutions. No less important were questions about the nature of Ukraine’s nation building project, including the role of history, ethnicity, language, and culture in the forging of Ukraine’s political nation. Could a country whose citizens represented different ethnicities, spoke (often interchangeably) more than one language, belonged to more than one church, and inhabited a number of diverse historical regions withstand not only the onslaught of a more militarily powerful colonial master but also its claim to the loyalty of everyone who spoke Russian or worshipped at an Orthodox church?